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Article 8

Doing Things
with Acts
James Robert Wood
Actions and Objects from Hobbes
to Richardson by Jonathan
Kramnick. Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2010,
Pp. 307. $65 cloth, $24.95 paper,
$24.95 e-book.

Jonathan Kramnick’s absorbing
new book explores how philosophers, poets, and writers of fiction grappled with the conceptual
problems surrounding the nature
of human action between roughly
1650 and 1750. Kramnick presents
action as an interface between the
world and the mind. In a typically
aphoristic phrase, he observes early
on in the book that “Actions extend
mind into the world” (3, his emphasis). A commonsense account
of action might be to say that actions occur when people decide to
do something and then perform
physical motions that cause things
to happen in the world. Kramnick,
however, is especially interested in
writers who investigated the possible reversibility of this sequence,
thus bringing “the world into the
mind” (5). Against standard narratives of deepening interiority,
Kramnick shows how writers
from Thomas Hobbes to Samuel
Richardson emphasized the role of
external causes in the shaping of intentional acts.
Kramnick’s book is exemplary
for the clarity with which it divides
up the spectrum of philosophical positions on human action. Probably
the most important crux for Kramnick’s authors was the problem of
defining the difference between
intentional acts and physical events.
This difference is nicely illustrated
in the beginning pages through the
contrast between the historic appearance of Halley’s Comet in 1682
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and the cutting of Belinda’s hair in
Alexander Pope’s The Rape of the
Lock (1714). Asking why the Baron
cut Belinda’s hair involves issues of
intention that are irrelevant when
we ask why the comet returned to
the skies. The distinction between
intended actions and physical events
might seem simple on the face of it.
But describing and accounting for
this difference turns out to be exceptionally difficult.
The problem of action is bound
up with the problem of consciousness: the puzzle of explaining how it
is that some clumps of matter seem
to possess consciousness whereas
others do not. Kramnick is especially interested in the counterintuitive conclusions to which thinkers
were sometimes driven by their efforts to explain consciousness and
its connection to intentional actions.
At one extreme was the position
that consciousness is an illusion and
nothing and no one really has it.
The other extreme was the position
that everything in nature possesses
at least some consciousness. In both
cases, the distinction between the
things that people do and the things
that things do disappears. Many
writers, however, found themselves
somewhere along the continuum
between the two extremes, often
reaching the compromise position
that consciousness is a property that
emerges from particles that are not
themselves conscious.
The upshot was that the actions of conscious agents could not

be easily disentangled from the
nonconscious world that enfolded
them. The idea that the Baron’s
decision to cut Belinda’s hair might
not be so different in nature from
the return of Halley’s Comet had
to be taken seriously. Pope himself points to the possibility that
the “am’rous Causes” operating on
the Baron may be just as irresistible
as the gravitational forces operating on Halley’s Comet. Kramnick
shows how writers tried to account
at once for the mind-bound nature
of intentional actions and also for
their implication in a causal network that extends outside the mind
into the world beyond the self.
Kramnick’s method is to focus on
a series of cases in which a problem
about the nature of action emerges
in a text or in the space between
texts. He begins with the debate
on free will between Hobbes and
John Bramhall in which Hobbes
contended that the will behind
any human action can be traced
to antecedent causes in the world,
whereas Bramhall argued that the
will is formed independently of
these causes. Kramnick then turns
to the problem of consciousness by
way of the dueling translations
of Lucretius’s De Rerum Natura
by Thomas Creech (in 1682) and
John Wilmot, the second earl of
Rochester. Kramnick suggests
that Creech’s and Rochester’s
translations are influenced by the
translators’ differing ideas about
the existence of consciousness.

on Actions and objects
Whereas Creech’s Lucretius shows
consciousness emerging from insensate particles, Rochester tends to
put Lucretius into reverse, having
consciousness dissolve back into the
particles from which it emerged.
Kramnick turns over the next chapter entirely to Rochester’s poetry,
reading his philosophical and sexual verse as attempting “alternately
to fit mental states to actions after
they have already happened or to
get rid of both entirely” (140). The
following chapter on John Locke
returns to Kramnick’s overarching
concern with how positions on action are worked out in conflict and
conversation with others, tracking
how Locke revised his ideas on action in An Essay Concerning Human
Understanding (1690) following his
discussions with Irish philosopher
William Molyneaux.
The last two chapters turn from
poetry and philosophy to prose fiction. Kramnick reads Eliza Haywood’s Love in Excess (1719–20) and
Fantomina (1725) as fictions about
the problem of determining the
presence of consent in intimate relationships. Both of these amatory
fictions stage sexual encounters between men and women where the
woman’s conscious consent seems
ambiguous, at best. Kramnick’s argument is that the style and narrative techniques of Haywood’s early
novels develop a picture of consent
that is in many respects comparable
to Locke’s account of tacit consent
in the Two Treatises of Government
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(1690). For Locke, the consent of
the governed is not located primarily in the conscious intentions
of individuals but rather inferred
through their participation in civil
society. Likewise in early Haywood, according to Kramnick,
consent does not inhere in the mind
but “hovers in the world or on one’s
skin or between bodies or over different slices of time” (193).
The last chapter will play a key
role in the ongoing critical debate
on Richardson’s Clarissa (1748).
Whereas William Warner and
Terry Castle have read the conflict
between Clarissa and Lovelace as
a struggle between two mutually
incompatible accounts of interpretation, Kramnick understands
their contention as one between
two mutually incompatible accounts of action. Clarissa holds
that the will to perform an action
is formed independently of external circumstances. To the charge of
doing terrible things—for example
running away with Lovelace, having sex with him, and, in the end,
willing herself to die—she characteristically replies that she has not
acted in any of these cases since she
formed no intention to do any of
these things. Whereas Clarissa believes that an action without an intention is no action at all, Lovelace
treats actions as primary and intentions as immanent within them.
Kramnick thus reads Lovelace’s
machinations throughout the novel
as “attempts to arrange Clarissa’s
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environment to make it appear as
if she has consented, or, what is the
same, to make it so she has already
consented” (216, his emphasis). The
chapter ends with a reconsideration of the conundrum of whether
Clarissa commits suicide, in which
Kramnick does not so much supply
an answer as show how the answer
depends on the implicit theory of
action that the reader brings to the
book.
Kramnick’s book invites comparisons to Sandra Macpherson’s
Harm’s Way: Tragic Responsibility
and the Novel Form (2010). These
books share certain concerns and
deal with essentially the same period of English literature. Both
Kramnick and Macpherson are
impatient with what Macpherson
dubs the “interiority thesis”: the
story that has literature taking a
turn inward into the self over the
long eighteenth century. They are,
however, quite dissimilar in their
argumentative strategies. Whereas
Kramnick’s argument draws on
the philosophy of action, Macpherson’s is based on the legal concept of strict liability, which made
perpetrators punishable for their
harmful actions regardless of their
intentions. Her argument, pursued
with an attorney’s tenacity, is that
strict liability underlies the sense of
justice within the novel as a genre.
Kramnick’s argument against
the interiority thesis does not rest
on establishing the irrelevance
of intention and therefore the

unimportance or nonexistence of
interiority. Rather, he questions the
assumption that intention and interiority necessarily go together. He
shows that even mental states like
consent and intent, which we might
imagine as subsisting securely
within the mind, were frequently
understood in the period as having an existence outside the head.
Kramnick takes care to note that
the externalist reading of intentions
was always in dialogue with a contrary understanding of intentions as
formed by the self independently of
outward circumstances. Whereas
Macpherson holds that the novel
offers essentially one answer on the
question of action, defining recalcitrant writers like Henry Fielding
as outliers, Kramnick makes no
such claims for the univocality of
any particular genre or the period
that he studies. He emphasizes instead the differences between authors, between rival translations
of a work, between successive editions of a text, and between the
opinions of literary characters. If
Macpherson is like an attorney in
an adversarial system, Kramnick
is more like a judge summing up
the main arguments before the jury
retires. Macpherson’s drive to make
her novels fit one description of action sometimes (for this reviewer)
results in a certain stretching of interpretation. But Kramnick’s very
openness to the internal debates
of texts seems to result in its own
kind of stretching in the chapter

on Actions and objects
on Clarissa. After all, Richardson’s
text refuses to allow readers to hold
Clarissa’s and Lovelace’s positions
in suspension. Indeed, Richardson
seems to have done everything he
could with the editorial commentary appended to successive editions
of the novel to persuade readers to
take Clarissa’s outlook on action
over Lovelace’s, even if successive
readers have found Lovelace’s libertine position seductive.
In keeping with Kramnick’s
general concern for opening up
problems rather than resolving
them, his book ends not with a
conclusion but a question: “Has
anything happened? If so, who or
what is its cause?” (230). This final
question will disappoint readers
searching for a single takeaway
thesis from Kramnick’s book. It is,
however, precisely because Kramnick’s book is less thesis driven than
Macpherson’s that it can afford to
be more ecumenical in its consideration of the diverse approaches to
the problem of how minds fit into
the world. Kramnick allows space
for his writers (and his readers) to
think. He frequently takes the individual sentence as his primary unit
of analysis, showing how writers
define the relation between actions
and agents through syntax and
style. In Locke’s revised version of
his chapter on action, for example,
“the prose takes a dilatory form
uncharacteristic of the first edition: each sentence wrangles into a
multiple devolution of subordinate
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clauses” (156). In Haywood’s prose,
“states of mind seem almost to
overflow the sentence, in marked
excess of the pronoun to which they
belong. The effect is that the grammatical subject of the clause seems
to traipse after her own mind”
(184). As these examples show,
Kramnick’s couches his acute observations on prose style in a lively
and luminous style of his own.
The close attention to the specific workings of sentences in Actions and Objects—both Kramnick’s
own and those of his writers—fits
a book that deliberately turns away
from grand literary-historical narrative in favor of a focus on the
singularities of the individual author and the individual text. The
book does offer a loose historical
trajectory, which moves from “a
new attention to actions amid dynastic anxieties and civil war to a
concern with minds and behavior
amid polite and commercial exchange” (12). But Kramnick tells
us at the outset that his book will
tell no linear story about how ideas
about action changed over time:
“My goal has not been to follow
a single perspective as it grows to
dominance, however, but rather
to examine competing models of
mind and action across the period
and into ours” (viii). Kramnick’s refusal to impose a grand récit on his
materials enables him to avoid the
perils of teleology. But Actions and
Objects sometimes made me wish
for the kind of large-scale “plot”

526	james robert wood
that undergirded Kramnick’s previous book, Making the English
Canon (1999). The absence of such
a plot is not a bad thing in itself
(why should we expect ideas about
action to develop in one direction
over time?), but some overarching issues are raised by Kramnick’s
book that ask to be worked out
on a larger historical canvas. The
question of sexuality, for example,
arises again and again in the book,
probably because it is in this area in
particular that a simple dualistic account of the mind’s relation to the
body threatens to break down. One
of the avenues for research that
Kramnick’s book opens up, then,
is a wider rethinking of the history
of sexuality through the problem of
human action.
Like the best literary criticism,
Kramnick’s work forces us to reconsider the fundamental assumptions
that we bring to texts. The reader
emerges from Actions and Objects
with a new sense of the foreignness

with which seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century writers conceived of the links or lack thereof
among persons, intentions, and actions. His readings succeed in raising
a set of important questions about
the ontology of actions that have
either gone unasked or have been
subsumed under the problematic of
interpretation. The last two chapters on Haywood and Richardson in
particular challenge the grounds on
which those authors have been read.
Kramnick’s book invites its readers to
rethink some of the basic stories that
critics tell their students and themselves about literary history. Actions
and Objects will be a key guide for
critics searching for alternatives to
narratives of rising interiority as they
try to make sense of what happened
to English literature and thought between Rochester and Richardson.
James Robert Wood teaches in the Department
of English at Trinity College Dublin. He is
working on a book entitled “Enlightenment
Anecdotes.”

